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 prevent information from being communicated). En-
 hancing the importance of what the justices had to say
 on this- issue was the evidence the Pentagon Papers
 contained that the United States government had
 deceived the public about the war, information highly
 relevant to the intense political debate that was raging
 at the time over when and how to end American
 military involvement in Vietnam.
 Although the Post's Sanford Ungar produced a
 highly readable journalistic account of the legal and
 political battle over the Pentagon Papers (The Papers
 and the Papers: An Account of the Legal and Political
 Battle over the Pentagon Papers [1972]), David Ruden-
 stine's book is the first true history of these notable
 cases. It is also a major contribution to the rather thin
 literature on the legal and constitutional history of the
 Vietnam conflict, a field that cries out for exploration
 by scholars interested in more than just whether
 Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon abused presiden-
 tial power by waging a war never declared by Congress.
 Ironically, Rudenstine makes an important contribu-
 tion to our understanding of the disintegration of the
 imperial presidency in the wake of Vietnam, providing
 a useful supplement to Stanley Kutler's monumental
 The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon
 (1990). He argues persuasively that "The Pentagon
 Papers affair ... led directly to the unraveling and final
 disintegration of the Nixon presidency" (p. 6).
 Rudenstine makes some other interesting and novel
 arguments as well. It has always been somewhat diffi-
 cult to understand why the Nixon administration
 fought so hard to enjoin publication of the Pentagon
 Papers, since dissemination of the information they
 contained served mainly to embarrass its Democratic
 predecessors. Disputing the theory that this lawsuit
 was part of a campaign to intimidate the press, Ru-
 denstine insists that Justice Department lawyers, led
 by Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian,
 pressed the president to initiate a prior-restraint ac-
 tion because they genuinely believed release of the
 papers would threaten important national security
 interests. Nixon acceded to their entreaties because
 Henry Kissinger convinced him he would appear weak
 in the eyes of foreign leaders if he did not do some-
 thing about this massive leak of classified information.
 Rudenstine agrees with those who contend that
 publication of the Pentagon Papers did not harm the
 military, defense, or international interests of the
 United States. He insists, however, that although the
 papers were largely historical in nature, they did
 contain some information that could have inflicted
 injury. Thus, the concerns of Mardian and the national
 security officials who supported the Justice Depart-
 ment's prior-restraint action were not entirely ground-
 less. Although he stresses the significance of the
 Supreme Court's decision in the case, he minimizes the
 significance of the massive release of government
 secrets that it facilitated. Rudenstine thinks this af-
 fected debate on the Vietnam War but had no impact
 on the course of the war itself.
 For the most part, Rudenstine effectively supports
 his contentions. Only his argument that the Pentagon
 Papers contained information truly damaging to na-
 tional security is unpersuasive. Forced to convince the
 Supreme Court that they did, Solicitor General Erwin
 Griswold (who admittedly lacked adequate research
 time) could identify only eleven items in forty-seven
 volumes that he thought supported such a contention.
 Although the last four volumes did contain diplomatic
 documents, release of which could have hampered
 American diplomacy, the significance of most of the
 information contained in the Pentagon Papers was
 historical and political. This material should not have
 been withheld from the public by classifying it as
 "secret."
 Mardian's objective was a judicial ruling that the
 government could restrain publication of anything on
 which someone had slapped a security classification
 stamp. Rudenstine skillfully elucidates the extent to
 which his extreme views determined the government's
 litigation strategy and impaired its chances of success
 in court. He also admirably points out that what is
 generally viewed as a case about the First Amendment
 was considered by the man who argued it for the New
 York Times, Yale Law School Professor Alexander
 Bickel, to be primarily a dispute about separation of
 powers. Rudenstine notes that several judges accepted
 Bickel's contentions if not his approach.
 Although impressive in many respects, Rudenstine's
 book is marred by a number of small but troubling
 errors. For example, he misspells the name of political
 scientist Samuel Popkin, refers to Republican Senator
 John Tower as a Democrat, and misidentifies the John
 Marshall Harlan Papers at Princeton as the John
 Marshall Papers. Although such mistakes are bound to
 raise concerns about his scholarship, this is a compe-
 tently researched monograph, solidly grounded in ju-
 dicial opinions, unpublished legal documents, manu-
 script collections, and numerous interviews. The pace
 at which Rudenstine discusses legal arguments and
 judicial opinions is somewhat plodding, but otherwise
 he writes well. This book is a readable and worthwhile
 monograph that merits the serious attention of both
 constitutional historians and students of the Vietnam
 era.
 MICHAEL R. BELKNAP
 California Western School of Law
 LAURA KALMAN. The Strange Career of Legal Liberal-
 ism. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. viii,
 375.
 This is a rewarding and insightful book that seeks to
 explain where, intellectually and politically, contempo-
 rary liberal legal academics stand and how they got
 there. Laura Kalman defines her subject, "legal liber-
 alism," as a "trust in the potential of courts, particu-
 larly the Supreme Court," to effect desirable and
 nationwide social change, especially improving the
 conditions of favored groups such as blacks, women,
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 and workers (p. 2). The "strange career" of her title
 refers to the twisting efforts of liberal legal academics
 to sustain over time the activist constitutionalism of
 the Supreme Court under Earl Warren against a series
 of challenges to its efficacy and legitimacy.
 As late as the 1960s, Kalman writes, legal academics
 overwhelmingly favored the results of the Warren
 Court and debated only "the means it used" (p. 49).
 Their disagreements constituted merely "a family
 quarrel between Warren Court activists and process
 theorists, two wings of the realist tradition" (p. 48). In
 the 1970s, however, things changed. The entry of
 significant numbers of women and minorities into the
 profession heightened diversity; Roe v. Wade and
 affirmative action split liberals deeply; the country
 grew increasingly conservative, cost conscious, and
 wary of government; Ronald Reagan's administration
 reshaped American politics and effectively advanced
 "originalism" as a device to delegitimate liberal con-
 stitutionalism; and a reconstructed Supreme Court
 moved rightward and began experimenting with its
 own brand of conservative judicial activism. Those
 challenges proved especially distressing to liberal aca-
 demics because, at the same time, a range of ideas,
 methods, and stances that were eventually yoked to-
 gether under the label of postmodernism invaded the
 law schools from other academic disciplines. The ideal
 of interdisciplinary scholarship and the apparent utility
 of postmodernist modes fired the imagination of many
 legal liberals, but the new approaches exacted a high
 price. Postmodernism scattered them intellectually,
 undermined their normative assumptions, robbed
 them of the hope for objectivity, and led them toward
 ever more debilitating theories and ever more pro-
 found crises.
 Against this background, Kalman's book examines
 some of the major debates that filled the law reviews.
 She focuses on the oblique but powerful claims of the
 attacking conservative originalists, the uses of the era's
 heralded theoretical turns (cultural, hermeneutic, lin-
 guistic, and historical), and the strained if serviceable
 responses of the counterattacking Republican revival-
 ists and neo-Federalists. One of the book's major
 contributions is the way it situates for those outside the
 legal academy some of the disparate, puzzling, and
 sometimes seemingly perverse claims that law profes-
 sors have recently advanced and debated.
 At the heart of Kalman's book lies a deep concern
 with the perplexing relationship between law and
 history. Reflecting on the historical turn in constitu-
 tional rhetoric during the past two decades, she probes
 for a coherent line to identify and distinguish between
 proper historical and legal scholarship while at the
 same time exploring ways in which historians may
 legitimately illuminate and assist the work of lawyers.
 Professionally trained in law as well as history, Kalman
 tells us that she feels like "something of an outsider to
 both disciplines" (p. 9). Although her remark finesses
 the substantial differences that separate practicing
 lawyers from law professors, it does point to the
 amazingly tenacious disciplinary assumptions that of-
 ten wall off supposedly related academic fields, and it
 suggests further the extent to which multidisciplinary
 training can be professionally enervating as well as
 intellectually liberating.
 More particularly, Kalman's remark highlights the
 fact that the work of the historian and the lawyer-in
 spite of their multiple and intimate overlaps in both
 subject and method-are not only distinct but, in
 critical ways, inconsistent. Her dual training allows her
 to understand the professional ethic of each field and
 to experience deeply their conflicting injunctions and
 aspirations. Although she offers some optimistic words
 about their compatibilities, she remains understand-
 ably vague and uneasy. "Once again," Kalman con-
 cludes at one point, "historians and law professors are
 talking past each other in their dialogue of the deaf"
 (p. 229).
 Inevitably, a book of such complexity has its flaws.
 Kalman's definition of legal liberalism, for example,
 does not encompass the "objective" foundations of law
 that the book seems to see as intrinsic to it. Further,
 she too readily accepts the importance of Alexander
 Bickel's statement of "the counter-majoritarian diffi-
 culty" (The Least Dangerous Branch [1962]) without
 exploring the contingent social factors that made his
 formulation seem so new, central, insightful, and self-
 evident. Finally, the book provokes fascinating ques-
 tions that readers will wish Kalman had pursued in
 greater depth. Why have American academics revived
 grand theory so vigorously? Why do legal academics
 continue to focus so inordinately on the words of the
 Supreme Court rather than on the court's role in the
 complex dispute-settling and norm-enforcing practices
 that give the law its practical meaning and signifi-
 cance? To what extent have postmodern modes led
 legal academics away from exploring more deeply the
 meaning of the late Robert Cover's blunt reminder-
 starkly distinguishing, among other things, the work of
 the.lawyer and historian-that "death and pain are at
 the center of legal interpretation" (p. 118)?
 Kalman has written a sophisticated and highly infor-
 mative book that provides an illuminating map of key
 debates that helped drive legal academic discourse
 during the past three decades. It will be essential
 reading for anyone interested in the intellectual his-
 tory of the contemporary law teaching profession or
 the perplexing interplay between between law and
 history that original intent constitutionalism inspired
 in the 1980s.
 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.
 New York Law School
 MICHAEL J. SANDEL. Democracy 's Discontent: America
 in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge: Belknap
 Press of Harvard University Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 417.
 $24.95.
 This book contains a long, often insightful, but flawed
 jeremiad. As have so many other recent social critics,
 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW OCTOBER 1997
This content downloaded from 208.67.210.24 on Wed, 14 Nov 2018 20:25:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
